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THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF
EQUALITY IN CANADA
Kathleen E. Mahoney*
I. INTRODUCTION
On April 17, 1982, Canada repatriated its constitution from the
Parliament at Westminster, sweeping away one of the final vestiges
of its colonial past. At the same time, a Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms' was constitutionally entrenched, giving the people
express constitutional rights for the first time. The equality provi-
sions, in particular, represented a new era in Canadian constitu-
tional law.
The intense debate leading up to the entrenchment of the Charter
raised profound questions about the basic nature of the country, its
values, and its ability and willingness to acknowledge equality for
women and other disadvantaged groups. For the first time, equality
seekers participated in the process of constitutional renewal.2 They
expressed a clear desire to be full and equal citizens in Canadian
society and to have their needs and aspirations translated into con-
stitutionally recognized rights.3 As a result of the largest lobbying
and participatory effort ever mounted by ordinary citizens, particu-
larly women," very broad and comprehensive equality guarantees"
* Professor, Faculty of Law, The University of Calgary; LL.B., University of Brit-
ish Columbia, 1976; LL.M., Cambridge University, 1979; Diploma in International
Human Rights, Strasbourg University, 1987. An earlier draft of this paper was
presented at a "Justice and Gender" conference sponsored by the University of
Maine School of Law in October, 1991. It was presented in a different form to the
Canadian-American Cooperation Section at the San Antonio, Texas, meeting of the
Association of American Law Schools in January, 1992.
1. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), being Schedule B of the Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11 sched. B (Eng.) (herein-
after Charter].
2. The Special Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on the
Constitution of Canada sat from November 7, 1980, to February 9. 1981. to hear sub-
mission on the Constitution. Over 1,200 groups and individuals appeared before the
Committee. See Issue 57 of the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence for the Com-
mittee's Report to Parliament submitted on February 13, 1981.
3. See Katherine J. de Jong, Sexual Equality: Interpreting Section 28, in EQUAL-
iTY RIGHTS AND THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMs 493-528 (Anne F.
Bayefsky & Mary Eberts eds., 1985). See also, EDWARD MCWHINNEY, CANADA AND THE
CONSTrrUTION 1979-1982, at 104-05 (1982).
4. See Penney Kome, THE TAKING OF 28 (1983); Chaviva Hoek, Women and Con-
stitutional Process, in AND No ONE CHEERED 280 (Keith Banting & Richard Simeon
eds., 1983); LISE GOTELL, THE CANADIAN WOMEN'S MOVE.%tENT. EQUALTY RIGHTS AND
THE CHARTER (1990).
5. Section 15 of the Charter actually contains four equality guarantees and an
affirmative action provision. It reads as follows:
(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to
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were entrenched in the Constitution. In addition, a specific section
entrenching sexual equality as an overriding principle of the Charter
was included, the intention clearly being to ensure that Canadian
women would enjoy a status equal to that of Canadian men.0
Since the entrenchment of the Charter in 1982, equality seekers
have continued to play a significant role. They have used litigation
and other strategies in order to clarify and develop approaches to
constitutional theory and interpretation so that the Charter's prom-
ise of equality will be realized.' From the outset, they recognized
that entrenched comprehensive equality rights would not bring
about legal equality on their own; in order for people to become true
equal bearers of rights under the Charter, the content of established
rights and concepts would have to be challenged, and the legal
norms of existing societal and institutional structures premised on
inequality would have to be changed.8
It is the Author's view that the Supreme Court of Canada, to
quite a remarkable degree, has recognized the egalitarian challenge
the Charter presents. In the past few years, the Court has launched
a promising new era for equality jurisprudence quite unique in the
world. The equality theory developed by the Court goes far beyond
that which underlies the constitutional law of other western socie-
ties, including Europe and the United States. The Court has fash-
ioned principles that give disadvantaged groups a better chance
than ever before to alleviate the inequities they experience in laws,
policies, and the practices of governments and government officials.
This is because, instead of using abstract, formal rules to analyze
equality and discrimination, the Canadian Supreme Court applies a
purposive, contextual approach to constitutionally entrenched
equality guarantees, which in turn defines the scope and purpose of
these guarantees in terms of individuals and groups persistently dis-
advantaged by the legal system.
the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination
and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has
as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or
groups including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or
ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
Charter, supra note 1, § 15.
6. For a discussion of the history and interpretation of section 28 of the Charter,
see de Jong, supra note 3, at 494-512.
7. For example, the Women's Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF) is a Ca-
nadian group created to promote women's equality through litigation of precedent-
setting cases, using the sex equality guarantees in the Charter of Rights and Free-
doms. See also SHERENE RAZACK, CANADIAN FEMINISM AND THE LAW (1991).
8. See Mary Eberts, Sex-based Discrimination and the Charter, in EQUALITY
RIGHTS AND THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS, 183, 199 (Ann F.
Bayefsky & Mary Eberts eds., 1985).
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To fully understand the Canadian approach to Charter equality
guarantees, the history of equality and discrimination law must be
examined. To a large extent, the Supreme Court's interpretation of
constitutional equality guarantees in the Charter has been informed
and influenced by the lessons and themes which have emerged from
the common law, human rights legislation, and earlier attempts at
constitutional reform. In this Article, I discuss the development of
legal equality in Canada, including pre-Charter recognition of the
concepts of equality, inequality, and discrimination, as well as post-
Charter interpretations of constitutional equality guarantees. I also
discuss the effects of the Supreme Court's constitutional-equality
jurisprudence beyond constitutional law-effects which may ulti-
mately hold the greatest promise for the achievement of social
equality in Canada.
II. EARLY DEVELOPMENT
Equality in Canada has been an evolutionary process-a slow
struggle whereby legislatures, the Parliament of Canada, and some-
times the courts have incrementally responded to varying degrees of
pressure to eliminate or reduce conditions of disadvantage. One rea-
son progress has been so slow is that different groups, being disad-
vantaged in different ways, often did not communicate effectively
with each other, and thus their common cause was often overlooked.
In this Article the example of gender inequality is used to show how
change has come about and where it may lead. Gender is the exam-
ple used here because women experience all the disadvantages ex-
perienced by disadvantaged groups, because women constitute more
than one-half of the Canadian population, and because the women's
movement in Canada has led the way in the struggle for equality.
Less than one hundred years before the enactment of the Charter,
the social and economic position of women was dismal. Women were
unable to vote, hold elected or appointed office, sit on a jury, or par-
ticipate in the professions. Employment outside the home provided
minimal opportunities and very low wages. If a woman became preg-
nant during her employment, she could be discriminated against
with impunity because differential treatment on the basis of preg-
nancy was not considered to be discrimination on the basis of sex."
At the same time, she was legally forbidden access to information
9. See Bliss v. Attorney Gen. of Canada, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183; Leier v. C.I.P. Paper
Products Ltd. (unpublished), discussed in SASKATCHEWAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMI.s. I.
NEWSLETTER, Dec. 1978, at 1-2, cited in WALTER SURMA TARNOPOLSKY & WILLIAM F
PENTNEY, DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 8-13 (1989); Wong v. Hughes Petroleum, 4
C.H.R.R. (Canadian Human Rights Reporter) D/1488 (1983); Breton v. La Societe
Can. des M~taux Reynolds Ltke, 2 C.H.H.R. D/532 (1981); Nye v. Burke, 2 C.H.H.R.
D/538 (1981); La Commission des Droits et Libertks de la Personne du Qubec v.
L'Equipe du Formulaire L.T. Inc., 3 C.H.R.R. D/1141 (1982).
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about, and effective methods of, controlling her fertility. Marriage
exacerbated women's second-class citizenship by removing the few
rights or legal recognitions single women possessed. For example, a
married woman lost her own nationality and domicile upon marriage
if it differed from that of her husband. In addition, the father of
children of the marriage had the legal right at common law to deter-
mine their religion and education.10 Married women were unable to
make wills or enter into binding contracts and lost almost complete
control over their real and personal property to their husbands. The
common law permitted a husband to beat his disobedient wife' and
rape her without fear of punishment.12 Even after these cruel laws
were repealed, the trivialization of wife abuse continued-and in
many ways persists until this day. 3
In particular, the law regulating sexual assault presented unique
barriers to the realization of women's rights to bodily security and
equal right to protection and benefit of the law.' 4 The rules of cor-
roboration, recent complaint, warnings to the jury regarding a wo-
man victim's credibility, and allowance of examination of the vic-
tim's prior sexual history, all treated women victims of violent
assault in a gender-specific, disadvantaged way.' 5 Until 1980, sexual
harassment of women in the workplace was not even recognized as a
legal issue.' It took an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada to
10. See generally CATHERINE L. CLEVERDON, THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT IN
CANADA (2d ed. 1974); Margaret E. MacLellan, History of Women's Rights in Can-
ada, in CULTURAL TRADITION AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF WOMEN IN CANADA (1971).
11. See Mary Metzger, A Social History of Battered Women 59 (copies distrib-
uted at consultation for Feminist Services Training Program Coordinators, sponsored
by Canadian Secretary of State Women's Programme, Nov. 28-30, 1979).
12. See generally TERRY DAVIDSON, CONJUGAL CRIME: UNDERSTANDING AND CHANG-
ING THE WIFE BEATING PATTERN (1978); DIANA E.H. RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE
(1982).
13. See Kathleen E. Mahoney, The Legal Treatment of Wife Abuse: A Case of
Sex Discrimination (unpublished course materials, Judicial Education Seminar
(1991), Western Judicial Education Center, 1362 Mathers Avenue, Vancouver, British
Columbia, V7V 2K5). This article will also appear in (1992) U.NBLJ when
published.
14. See Sheilah Martin, The Social Context of Sexual Violence (unpublished
course materials, Judicial Education Seminar (1991), Western Judicial Education
Centre, 1362 Mathers Avenue, Vancouver, British Columbia, V7V 2K5).
15. See T. Brettel Dawson, Sexual Assault Law and Past Sexual Conduct of the
Primary Witness, 2 CAN. J. OF WOMEN AND THE LAW 310 (1988); Jeffrey G. Hoskins,
The Rise and Fall of the Corroboration Rule in Sexual Offence Cases, 4 CAN J FAM
L 173 (1983); Lucinda Vandervort, Mistake of Law and Sexual Assault: Consent and
Mens Rea, 2 CAN. J. OF WOMEN AND THE LAW 233 (1988); DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
OTTAWA. CANADA, SEXUAL ASSAULT LEGISLATION IN CANADA: AN EVALUATION REPORT
#2. THE NEW SEXUAL ASSAULT OFFENCES (1973); Lynne 0. Wener, An Examination of
the New Sexual Assault Legislation (1985) (manuscript available at the University of
Calgary Law Library); GISELA RUEBSAAT, THE NEW SEXUAL ASSAULT OFFENCES
EMERGING LEGAL ISSUES (1985).
16. See CONSTANCE BACKHOUSE & LEAH COHEN, THE SECRET OPPRESSION- SEXUAL
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determine, as late as 1989, that sexual harassment amounts to sex
discrimination and that it exacerbates the systemic gender inequal-
ity that exists in the workplace.'"
While certain legal inequalities have been eliminated, others per-
sist to the present day, particularly in areas where the Supreme
Court's Charter jurisprudence has yet to be felt. In the civil law of
tort, the persistent disadvantage of women affects the legal recogni-
tion of legitimate lawsuits, as well as the measurement of compensa-
tion when women do succeed in establishing their claims. For exam-
ple, in personal injury cases, it has only very recently been
recognized that the impairment of homemaking capacity is properly
a compensable loss to the homemaker rather than to her spouse, and
even to this day the contention is resisted. Where assessments have
been awarded, they have been meager in the extreme, especially by
comparison with those awarded for impairment of working capacity
outside the home.' 8 Similarly, in legal texts the concerns and inter-
ests of women are, by and large, not addressed. For example, Chris-
tine Boyle points out in a review of two leading Canadian textbooks
on remedies that "human" is equated with "male." When the au-
thors of these texts relate general principles to remedies, the concen-
tration is on commercial or property interests rather than on areas
of arguably greater interest to women, such as family law or public
interest equality law.19
When race combines with gender, systemic disadvantage is more
pronounced. Aboriginal women in Canada, for example, have been
particularly singled out for adverse treatment. The Canadian version
of apartheid, The Indian Act, 0 successfully denied them their cul-
tural status, connection with family, property rights, inheritance,
and devolutionary rights.2"
Canadian women have never willingly accepted legally imposed
invisibility and disadvantage. History shows that they have persis-
tently protested their inequality, but a lack of power or access to
HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1978); TARNOPOLSKy & PENTNEY, supra note 9. at
8-23.
17. Janzen v. Platy Enter. Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1252.
18. See generally Ken Cooper-Stephenson, Past Inequities and Future Promise:
Judicial Neutrality in Charter Constitutional Tort Claims, in EQUALmrr" AND JUDI-
CIAL NEUTRALITY 226 (Kathleen E. Mahoney & Sheilah L. Martin eds., 1987).
19. See Christine Boyle, Book Review, 63 CAN. BA. REv 427, 430-31 (1985) (re-
viewing RJ. SHARPE, INJUNCTIONS AND SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE (1983)).
20. R.S.C. ch. 1-6 (1970) (Can.) (repealed).
21. See Beverly Baines, Women, Human Rights, and the Constitution 28-31 (Aug.
1980) (unpublished manuscript available at Canadian Advisory Council on the Status
of Women, 151 Sparks Street, Box 1541, Station "B", Ottawa, Canada KIP 5R5 and
at University of New Brunswick Law Library). The offending provisions of the Indian
Act were repealed only after the Act was challenged under the International Conven-
tion on Civil and Political Rights and the United Nations Human Rights Committee
found that it violated the convention.
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power has impeded significant reform. A watershed event, however,
was the 1930 decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Coun-
cil in the "Persons" case,22 which held that the word "persons"
within the meaning of section 24 of the Constitution Act, 1867, in-
cluded women. The narrow ratio of the case stood for the proposi-
tion that women could no longer be denied appointment to the Sen-
ate of Canada solely because of their sex. They were "persons" as
much as men were. The broader implications of the decision reached
similar restrictions based on "personhood," such that qualifications
to practice law, to vote, or to hold other offices were gradually re-
moved.2" As far as formal inequality in statutes was concerned, a
victory of sorts was won. Canadian society came to recognize that
formal equality for women was a desirable goal. In real terms, how-
ever, women as a group continued to be disadvantaged as compared
to men. Women continued to suffer adverse treatment in employ-
ment, to be under-represented in all areas of public life, to be over-
represented in the poverty class, and to experience disproportionate
violence.2
III. PRE-CHARTER EQUALITY RIGHTS: THE NON-CONSTITUTIONAL
CONTEXT
A. The Canadian Bill of Rights
In 1960 the Parliament of Canada brought the Canadian Bill of
Rights into force. 25 Although the Bill of Rights does not have consti-
tutional status, the jurisprudence developed under it has had a
profound impact on the shape and content of the Charter guaran-
tees of 1982 and their judicial interpretation.
Section 1 of the Bill of Rights addresses equality. It reads, in per-
tinent part:
It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have ex-
isted and shall continue to exist without discrimination by reason
of race, national origin, colour, religion or sex, the following human
rights and fundamental freedoms, namely...
(b)the right of the individual to equality before the law
and the protection of the law .... 26
During the 1970s the Supreme Court of Canada decided ten cases
under this section. In nine of the cases, the Court declined to find
any breaches of "equality before the law" or of the "equal protection
22. Edwards v. Attorney Gen. of Canada, 1930 App. Cas. 124 (P.C. 1929) (revers-
ing the Supreme Court of Canada in In re Reference as to the Meaning of the Word
"Persons" in Section 24 of the British North America Act, 1867; 1928 S.C.R. 276).
23. See supra note 8, at 185-86.
24. Id. at 186-87.
25. 889 Eliz. II, ch. 44, [1960] 1 S.C. 519 (Can.).
26. R.S.C., app. III, pt. I, § 1 (1970) (Can.).
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of the law" guarantees. Needless to say, equality seekers were dis-
heartened by this result. It appeared to them that the Bill of Rights
was, in practice, an instrument more likely to perpetuate inequality
than to redress past inequities and promote reform. For example,
the two cases which involved gender equality show how judicial in-
terpretation of the equality provision merely served to perpetuate
inequality between women and men.
In Attorney General of Canada v. LaveU1, 2 7 two native women
challenged a section of the federal Indian Act "8 that disqualified
them from claiming their Indian status if they married outside their
race. The challenge was made under the sex equality guarantee of
the Bill of Rights because Indian males who married non-Indian
women did not suffer the same disqualification. Upon marrying non-
Indian women, males not only retained their Indian status, they au-
tomatically conferred full Indian rights and status on their non-In-
dian wives and children as well. By contrast, the effect of losing stat-
utory Indian status meant that upon marriage to a non-Indian,
Indian women were required to leave their reserve. They could not
own property on that reserve and were required to dispose of any
property they may have held up to the time of marriage. They could
be prevented from inheriting property and could take no further
part in band business. Because their children were not recognized as
Indian, they were denied access to the cultural and social amenities
of the community. The women could also be prevented from re-
turning to live with their families on the reserve, notwithstanding
dire need, illness, widowhood, divorce, or separation. The discrimi-
nation reached even beyond life-these women could not be buried
on the reserves with their ancestors.2 9
When this institutionalized gender inequality was put before the
Supreme Court of Canada, the Court found that the legislation did
not violate sex equality rights."0 The Court interpreted Section 1 of
the Bill of Rights to guarantee only procedural, not substantive,
equality.3" The Court said that Indian women were not the same as
Indian men and therefore could not be compared with them. As long
as all Indian women were treated the same, no violation of "equality
before the law" or "equal protection of the law" had occurred. 2 The
Court refused to consider the inherent unfairness or adverse effect
of the law on women.
27. 1974 S.C.R. 1349 (1973).
28. R.S.C., ch. 1-6, § 12(1)(b) (1970) (Can.) was the section challenged.
29. For a discussion of discrimination against aboriginal people generally, see
THOMAS P, BERGER, FRAGILE FREEDOMS HUMAN RIGHTS AND DissENr' IN CANADA
(1981).
30. Attorney Gen. of Canada v. Lavell, 1974 S.C.R. at 1372.
31. Id. at 1373.
32. Id. at 1372.
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The second case involved pregnancy discrimination. In Bliss v.
Attorney General of Canada,"3 the Court was asked to consider the
validity of a legislated benefit provision. The Unemployment Insur-
ance Act 3 4 required that before an unemployed pregnant woman
could qualify for maternity leave benefits, she must have been em-
ployed for ten weeks. At the same time, qualifications for unemploy-
ment benefits were less demanding for men and non-pregnant
women. The differential treatment of pregnant women was particu-
larly disadvantageous because women iii the fifteen weeks immedi-
ately surrounding the birth were barred from receiving ordinary
benefits even if they were able and willing to work.
When this inequality was challenged under section 1(b) of the Bill
of Rights, the Supreme Court refused to strike down the discrimina-
tory benefits provision because it could find no breach. Instead, the
Court came to the bizarre conclusion that discriminatory treatment
of pregnant women was not discrimination on the basis of sex. Jus-
tice Ritchie, speaking for the Court, stated:
Assuming the respondent to have been "discriminated against", it
would not have been by reason of her sex. Section 46 applies to
women, it has no application to women who are not pregnant, and
it has no application, of course, to men. If section 46 treats unem-
ployed pregnant women differently from other unemployed per-
sons, be they male or female, it is, it seems to me, because they are
pregnant and not because they are women.3
This very restrictive definition of discrimination confined judicial
scrutiny of sex as a protected criteria to sex as a totality, without
considering its components or consequences. (A comparable applica-
tion in the disability and race contexts would prohibit discrimina-
tion against the blind or against Sikhs but would not prohibit dis-
crimination against guide dogs or the wearing of turbans.30 ) The
Court further reasoned that the legislation conferred a special bene-
fit for a voluntary condition. 37 And any benefits or positive rights
conferred by statute were not subject to the equality provisions of
the Bill of Rights.
33. [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183 (1978).
34. Unemployment Insurance Act, ch. 48, § 30(1), 1970-1972 S.C. 981, 996-97
(Can.).
35. Bliss v. Attorney Gen. of Canada, [1979] 1 S.C.R. at 190-91 (quoting Attorney
Gen. of Canada v. Bliss, [1978] 1 F.C. 208, 213 (1977)).
36. See DALE GIBSON, THE LAW OF THE CHARTER. EQUALITY RIGHTS 31 (1990).
37. Bliss v. Attorney Gen. of Canada, [1979] 1 S.C.R. at 190-91. This voluntarism
rationale is still propounded by some as a justifiable limit on the right to equal treat-
ment. See, e.g., Thomas Flanagan, Manufacture of Minorities, in MINORITIES AND TIHE
CANADIAN STATE 107 (Neil Nevitte & Allan Kornberg eds., 1985). For a reply, see Dale
Gibson, Stereotypes, Statistics and Slippery Slopes: A Reply to Professors Flanagan
and Knopff and other Critics of Human Rights Legislation, in MINORITIES AND TIE
CANADIAN STATE 125-37.
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In both Lavell and Bliss, the Court embraced the view that the
right to be free from discrimination was a negative right-the right
to be free from something. The scope of this view was not broad
enough to include positive rights such as the right to enjoy an equal
share of society's benefits. Both cases had a considerable impact on
Canadian women. Not only did the cases teach them that the Court
was not particularly sympathetic to women's equality claims, they
also made them realize that any future constitutional provisions ad-
dressing equality would have to contain broader and clearer sub-
stantive protection in order for real equality-or even a semblance
of real equality-to be achieved.
B. Anti-Discrimination Statutes
Beginning in the early 1950s, Canadian provincial legislatures and
the federal government recognized the need for comprehensive legis-
lation prohibiting discrimination. The earliest acts dealt with fair
employment practices,-" but soon fair accommodation practices were
legislated as well."9 However, prior to the 1960s and 1970s anti-dis-
crimination legislation was piecemeal and uncoordinated, and it
placed the entire burden of promoting equality upon the individual
victims of discrimination."0 The result was that victims of discrimi-
nation rarely complained, and very little enforcement was
achieved.4
1
The situation improved once the provinces began to consolidate
and strengthen nondiscrimination statutes into human rights codes
administered by human rights commissions.42 The codes prohibited
discrimination in a number of areas, including employment, public
38. Ontario was the first jurisdiction to pass such legislation with The Fair Em-
ployment Practices Act, ch. 24, 1951 S.O. (Ont.). Within five years, Manitoba, Nova
Scotia, New Brunswick, British Columbia, and Saskatchewan adopted similar legisla-
tion. See The Fair Employment Practices Act, ch. 18, § 1, 1953 S.M. (2d Sess.)
(Man.); Fair Employment Practices Act, ch. 5, 1955 S.N.S. (N.S.); Fair Employment
Practices Act, ch. 9, 1956 S.N.B. (N.B.); Fair Employment Practices Act, ch. 16, 1956
S.B.C. (B.C.); The Fair Employment Practices Act, 1956, ch. 69, 1956 S.S. (Sask.).
39. Ontario again led the way with the Fair Accommodations Practices Act, ch.
24, § 2, 1954 S.O. (Ont.), which dealt with equality of access to "the accommodation,
services, facilities available in any place to which the public is customarily admitted."
40. For a critique of human rights legislation and procedure, see Shelagh Day,
The Process of Achieving Equality, in HUMAN RIGhTs IN CANADA INTO Tim 1990's
AND BEYOND 17 (R. Cholewinski ed., 1990). See also Shelagh Day, Impediments to
Achieving Equality, in EQUALITY AND JUDIcIAL NETrrRALITY, supra note 18, at 402.
41. See Day, Impediments to Achieving Equality, in EqUALITY AND JUDICiAL NEU-
TRALITY, supra note 18, at 404-05.
42. See TARNOPOLSKY & PENTNEY, supra note 9. at 2-6 and 14-1 to 15-1. For ex-
ample, in 1961 Ontario strengthened its human rights legislation by consolidating all
its nondiscrimination statutes in the Ontario Human Rights Code administered by
the Ontario Human Rights Commission. Ontario Anti-Discrimination Commission
Amendment Act, ch. 63, 1960-1961 S.O. 261 (Can.).
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accommodation, residential and commercial real estate, and adver-
tising. Legislators were of the view that the establishment of human
rights commissions charged with human rights education and with
the administration, promotion, and enforcement of human rights
legislation would make nondiscrimination a community responsibil-
ity. They thought that human rights legislation would both create a
general environment of equal opportunity and serve to correct past
inequalities. However, despite these laudable intentions, the legisla-
tion did very little to advance the status of women or other disad-
vantaged groups. In practice, the human rights legislation was un-
able to address the most serious discriminatory disadvantages. 3 For
example, despite protection from discriminatory practices in em-
ployment and equal pay provisions, the structure of the labour mar-
ket did not change. Women continued to predominate in occupa-
tional job "ghettos" such as secretarial, nursing, and teaching
occupations, where few men were employed. Anti-discrimination leg-
islation could not reach wide discrepancies in pay between men and
women in jobs of comparable responsibility and qualifications, just
as equal opportunity legislation could not require employers to pro-
vide women with opportunities comparable to those enjoyed by men.
Furthermore, anti-discrimination legislation was and continues to be
based on an individual complaint mechanism. Individuals may lodge
a complaint only if they claim to be or to have been the victim of a
violation of a statutory right. Only an individual woman denied a
promotion or opportunity on the basis of sex can complain about
widespread employment inequities. Nothing can be done for women
disadvantaged as a group by systemic institutionalized
discrimination.
Contributing to the legislation's ineffectiveness was the accept-
ance of the "sameness of treatment" concept of equality. Legislators
assumed that if women and men were treated the same procedur-
ally, both males and females of similar talent and motivation would
achieve the same opportunities and successes. What they failed to
take into account was that men, unlike women, do not experience
long-term, widespread societal conditioning and systemic subordina-
tion. When, for example, women's labour is confined to narrow, low-
valued, and low-paid areas of work generally unoccupied by male
workers, sameness of treatment will not ameliorate workplace disad-
vantage. This is because the situation of women workers in female
job ghettos has no male basis of comparison. If there is no basis of
comparison against which to prove differential treatment, the same-
ness-of-treatment definition cannot provide a legal basis for
complaint.
Furthermore, even when clearly differential treatment gave rise to
43. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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discrimination under these statutes, sameness of treatment as a
remedy was deficient because it could not make the necessary ad-
justments required to be fair. To use the now trite example of two
people competing in a footrace, the same-treatment model requires
only that both runners start and finish the race at the same points,
be equally free from any obstacles on the track, and be governed by
the same rules. Whether or not the runners have unequal strength,
training, or experience-or whether one is older, disabled, or
malnourished-is irrelevant. Social, economic, and physical disad-
vantages or prejudices become invisible. The result is that sameness
of treatment often has the effect of perpetuating inequality rather
than curing it.
While the recognition of formal equality between individuals was
an essential first step toward the achievement of legal and social
equality, the early experiences of equality seekers using human
rights legislation made it obvious that much more was required.
Equality issues arising out of women's unequal pay, allocation to
disrespected work, demeaned physical characteristics, as well as
targeting for rape, domestic battery, sexual abuse as children, sys-
tematic sexual harassment, use in degrading entertainment, and
forced prostitution could not be addressed through a system or ap-
proach requiring sameness of treatment or male comparators to
prove discrimination on the basis of gender. To address the deeply
entrenched second-class status of women, it became clear that a
markedly different approach was needed."
In the late 1980s some human rights statutes were amended to
address certain systemic inequalities.' More importantly, a series of
decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada indicated that the Court
intended to put substantive meaning into human rights guarantees.
The first major step was taken in Ontario Human Rights Commis-
sion and O'Malley v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd.46 when provincial anti-
discrimination legislation addressing private discrimination in access
44. See CATHARINE A- MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED Discounses ON LiFE
AND LAW 23-25, 40-41, 169-70 (1987).
45. Laws guaranteeing equal pay for work of equal value have been introduced in
a number of jurisdictions. In the federal jurisdiction and in Quebec, equal pay for
work of equal value is guaranteed in the human rights laws encompassing both public
and private sectors. See Canadian Human Rights Act. ch. 33. § 1. 1976-1977 S.C.
(Can.); Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q.. ch. C-12, § 19 (1977) (Que.).
Ontario has pay equity legislation applicable to private and public sector employers
with 10 or more employees. See Pay Equity Act, ch. 34. 1977 S.O. (Ont.). Legislation
in the Yukon, Nova Scotia, Manitoba, New Brunswick. and Prince Edward Island
requires pay equity for public sector employees. See Human Rights Act, R.S.Y., ch.
11, § 14, (1987) (Yukon); Pay Equity Act, ch. 16, 1988 S.N.S. (N.S.); The Pay Equity
Act, ch. 21, 1985 S.M. (Man.); Pay Equity Act, ch. P-5.01, 1989 S.N.B. (N.B.); Pay
Equity Act, R.S.P.E.I., ch. P-2 (1988) (P.E.I.). The provinces of Alberta, British Co-
lumbia, and the Northwest Territories do not have provisions for pay equity.
46. [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536.
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to employment, accommodation, and services and facilities was in-
terpreted. O'Malley involved unintended discrimination on the basis
of religion. In defining "discrimination," the Supreme Court said
that in addition to differential treatment with intent, the term also
encompassed unintended effects of neutral practices.' 7 Later, in Ca-
nadian National Railway v. Canada,48 the Court extended the con-
cept of discrimination to say that, notwithstanding formal equal
treatment, if neutral laws have had an unintended adverse effect on
protected groups or individuals, they may be discriminatory.9 A fur-
ther development occurred in Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd.,80
wherein the Court held that in order to prove discrimination it was
not necessary for the complainant to compare herself with a more
favoured group. This decision opened up to scrutiny many old, but
previously unchallenged, systemic problems.
In O'Malley the .Court gave greater weight to human rights laws
by holding that such laws are quasi-constitutional in nature and
'that, while they may not have the same overriding authority as a
constitutional provision, they have a natural primacy over other
laws.5' The O'Malley Court also set forth a purposive method as the
appropriate general approach to the interpretation of human rights
legislation. Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice McIntyre stated:
The accepted rules of construction are flexible enough to enable
the Court to recognize in the construction of a human rights code
the special nature and purpose of the enactment ... and give to it
an interpretation which will advance its broad purposes. Legisla-
tion of this type is of a special nature, not quite constitutional but
certainly more than ordinary-and it is for the courts to seek out
its purpose and give it effect."'
On the remedial side, the O'Malley Court further recognized that
affirmative action is sometimes necessary to cure systemic discrimi-
nation. 53 Acknowledging that discrimination is not always a wrong
only against an individual, the Court said that when a whole group
is wronged, the remedy must give full recognition of the group right
not to be discriminated against. 4
47. Id. at 547.
48. Canadian Nat'l Ry. v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Comm'n) [1987] 1
S.C.R. 1114.
49. Id. at 1138-39.
50. [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219.
51. Ontario Human Rights Comm'n and O'Malley v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd., [19851
2 S.C.R. at 547.
52. Id. This judgment built on Insurance Corp. of British Columbia v. Heerspink,
[1982] 2 S.C.R. 145. See also Winnipeg School Div. No. 1, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 150.
53. Ontario Human Rights Comm'n and O'Malley v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd., [19851
2 S.C.R. at 547.
54. Id.
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The Court later held in Central Alberta Dairy Pool v. Alberta"
that anti-discrimination legislation requires employers to reasonably
accommodate employee needs absent undue hardship."" Earlier, the
Supreme Court used a sexual harassment case, Robichaud v. Can-
ada,57 to establish the principle that employers are vicariously re-
sponsible for the discriminatory acts of their employees, in order to
emphasize that the purpose of human rights laws is to provide effec-
tive remedies to victims of discrimination. The Robichaud Court ob-
served that interpretations of the law which undermine its capacity
to effectively redress discrimination should be avoided. 8
In summary, all of these judge-made principles-repudiation of
"same treatment" as the definition of equality, the focus on equality
of outcome, the contextual, purposive approach to decision-making,
and the requirement of effective remedies-indicated that in the
context of human rights legislation, the Supreme Court had set out
to create a new substantive approach to equality rather than a pro-
cedural one.
IV. THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
In the early 1980s, the prospect of a new Charter of Rights pro-
vided an opportunity for women and others to advance their consti-
tutional interests beyond the formal equality constraints imposed in
the jurisprudence established under the Bill of Rights.
After a massive lobbying effort, two sections relevant to sex equal-
ity were incorporated into the Charter. They were section 15 and
section 28, which read as follows:
15.-(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and
has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law
without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination
based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or
mental or physical disability.
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity
that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvan-
taged individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged
because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age
or mental or physical disability.
28. Notwithstanding anything in this Charter, the rights and
freedoms referred to in it are guaranteed equally to male and fe-
male persons.19
Insertion of the guarantee of equality "under" the law was consid-
55. [1990] 2 S.C.R. 489.
56. Id. at 491.
57. 11987] 2 S.C.R. 84.
58. Id. at 92-94.
59. Charter, supra note 1, §§ 15, 28.
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ered to be essential in order to avoid the result reached in Bliss and
Lavell. It was thought that this guarantee would ensure that consti-
tutional review would reach the substance of laws as well as their
procedure. The guarantee of "equal benefit" of the law was proposed
to overcome the Bliss holding, which had permitted Parliament to
differentiate as long as a benefit, rather than a burden, was con-
ferred by legislation. Women argued that equal benefit must also be
guaranteed because under-inclusive laws denying benefits contribute
to the perpetuation of disadvantage just as much as laws requiring
adverse treatment.
The second equality provision, section 28, resulted because women
wanted assurance that their section 15 equality rights could never be
eroded. 0 The wording of the section makes it clear that it overrides
everything else in the Charter, arguably giving it a potency absent
from section 15.61 Because the section makes reference to all the
rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Charter, it has a very broad
application, encompassing equality in relation to all legal and politi-
cal rights. This means that it could be used to challenge freedom of
expression rights in the context of pornography, bodily security
rights in the context of police practices applied to wife abuse or sex-
ual assault cases, or any other gender-specific law, policy or practice
of government which has the effect of diminishing women's legal or
political rights compared to those of men. 2 Section 28 requires that
all persons must be able to enjoy all their constitutional rights and
freedoms equally, to an equal extent.
V. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF CHARTER EQUALITY GUARANTEES
Most scholars predicted that when it came time to interpret the
60. See Chaviva Hoek, Women and the Constitutional Process, in AND No ONE
CHEERED 280, 295-98 (Keith Banting & Richard Simeon eds., 1983); see also PENNEY
KOME, THE TAKING OF 28 (1983).
61. Section 15 is subject to the section 33 override provision, which allows prov-
inces and the federal Parliament under certain conditions to override the fundamen-
tal freedoms in section 2 or the rights in sections 7 to 15.
62. These section 28 arguments have been made in some constitutional cases, but
it is too early to tell whether the Supreme Court will give them the weight suggested
here. In Jane Doe v. Toronto Metropolitan Police, 74 O.R.2d 225 (Ont. Ct. App.
1990), the Court of Appeal of Ontario held that the plaintiff had the right to sue the
police force for its investigation of a serial rapist who sexually assaulted her and
many others. One of her complaints was that the police policy of keeping secret both
the assailant's modus operandi and the police estimation concerning where the assail-
ant would strike next violated her constitutional guarantee of equal security of the
person. Another example which does not bode well for the Author's proposition was
the case of Seaboyer and Gayme v. R., [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577, where rape shield 'provi-
sions were struck down as constitutional violations of the accused's guarantee of pre-
sumption of innocence. The majority did not even address the argument that
women's security rights and equality rights should weigh more heavily in the balance.
But see id. at 643 (L'Heureux-Dub6, J., dissenting).
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Charter guarantees, Canadian courts would be strongly influenced
by their American counterparts.6 3 It was thought that notwithstand-
ing the decisions rendered under human rights legislation, Canadian
courts would likely follow the American view that unintended or ad-
verse-impact results are excluded from the definition of discrimina-
tion for the purposes of constitutional law and that the "similarly
situated" definition of equality would be adopted.
6
'
Contrary to these predictions, however, the American constitu-
tional case law was not particularly influential in Canada's highest
court. Rather than ignoring its own human rights jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court of Canada built upon it in the interpretation of
Charter guarantees and rejected the constitutional equality jurispru-
dence of the U.S. courts.
The implications of this approach to constitutional equality guar-
antees are profound. The groundbreaking constitutional case was
Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia.5 Decided by the Su-
preme Court in February, 1989, the case arose when the Law Society
of British Columbia refused to admit a landed immigrant to the
practice of law because he did not meet the requirements of the Le-
gal Professions Act. The Act stipulated that practicing lawyers must
be Canadian citizens. But for his nationality, Mr. Andrews was fully
qualified to practice law. He brought an action to strike down the
provision, arguing that the citizenship requirement violated his
equality guarantees entrenched in section 15 of the Charter.
At trial his claim was rejected. The trial court found that although
discrimination on the ground of citizenship came within the purview
of section 15, the essence of discrimination is the drawing of "irra-
tional" distinctions. The court concluded that the citizenship re-
quirement was relevant to the practice of law and thus did not meet
the irrationality test."
The British Columbia Court of Appeal also rejected the com-
plaint, but for different reasons. This court adopted the view that
the essential meaning of the guarantees of equal protection and
63. See, e.g., Walter Tarnopolsky, The Equality Rights, in CANADIAN CAwrat oF
RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS: COMMENTARY (Walter Tarnopolsky & Gerald Beaudoin eds.,
1982). The author is now a judge of the Ontario Court of Appeal.
64. The United States Supreme Court requires that before a statute can be struck
down intentional discrimination must be found. It holds to this principle even though
American federal human rights legislation acknowledges disparate-impact discrimi-
nation. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297-99 (1987); Personnel Adm'r of
Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278-80 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239,
246-48 (1976).
65. [19891 1 S.C.R. 143. Two subsequent decisions added further clarification to
the principles articulated in Andrews. See Reference re Workers' Compensation Act,
1983 (Newfoundland), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 922; R. v. Turpin, 11989] 1 S.C.R. 1296.
66. Andrews v. Law Soc'y of British Columbia, 66 B.C.L.R. 363 (B.C. Sup. Ct.
1985).
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equal benefit of the law is that persons similarly situated should be
similarly treated. 7 It then tied this test to the meaning of "discrimi-
nation," which was defined in terms of reasonableness and fairness.
The court said that in order to prove a breach of the Charter equal-
ity guarantees, the onus was on the plaintiff to prove, on a balance
of probabilities, that the legislative means were unreasonable or un-
fair. The court then weighed the purposes of the legislation against
its effects on the individual adversely affected. 8
The Court of Appeal's requirement that interests be balanced sug-
gested a more nuanced approach than that of the trial court, which
required a mere testing of distinctions on the basis of rationality.
But the spectre of this Aristotelian approach 9 once again determin-
ing the content of equality guarantees caused widespread concern. 0
The decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal was ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.7 Five important equality
questions were put to the Court for the first time: the meaning of
the constitutional equality guarantee; its scope; the interests it is
designed to protect; the meaning of discrimination; and appropriate
remedies when a breach of section 15 is found.
Ultimately, the Court struck down the citizenship requirement in
the Legal Professions Act as a violation of section 15 equality rights.
In so doing, the Court differed markedly in its analysis from both
lower courts. In its discussion of equality and discrimination, five
fundamental principles emerged, all of which have major implica-
tions for equality under the Constitution. Summarized, the princi-
ples are as follows:
0 The interests protected by section 15 must be deter-
mined by way of a generous interpretation using a purposive
approach;
• The meaning of equality as sameness of treatment is
rejected in favour of an effects-based approach. Intention
need not be proven;
* The similarly-situated test is rejected;
• A finding of discrimination requires harm, prejudice or
disadvantage; and
67. Andrews v. Law Soc'y of British Columbia, 2 B.C.L.R. 2d 305, 311 (B.C. Ct.
App. 1986) (citing R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, 347).
68. Id. at 322.
69. See ARISTOTLE, ETHICA NICHOMACEN 1131 (W.D. Ross trans., 1925). See also
discussion supra part III.a.
70. Many third parties intervened in the appeal, including the Women's Legal
Education and Action Fund (L.E.A.F.) to argue against use of the similarly-situated
test in defining equality. Other intervenors included the Coalition of Provincial Orga-
nizations of the Handicapped, The Canadian Association of University Teachers, and
the Ontario Confederation of University Faculty Associations. Andrews v. Law Soc'y
of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143.
71. Id.
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0 The scope of the equality guarantee is limited to the
categories enumerated within the section or grounds analo-
gous to them.
Each of these themes is discussed below.
A. The Purposive Approach
It was clear from the decision in Andrews that the Supreme Court
wanted to make a difference for people in Canadian society who suf-
fer real inequality.
In adopting the purposive approach, the Court rejected the use of
formulaic, abstract rules to determine constitutional violations of
the equality guarantee. In earlier decisions, the Court had repeat-
edly directed that the Charter be interpreted with careful attention
paid to the equality provision's text, its legislative history, its role in
a free and democratic society, and its relationships to other Charter
rights. 2 Consistent with this approach, the Court said that the in-
terpretation of section 15 specifically required an appreciation and
understanding of its social and historical purpose, and of the inter-
ests it was intended to protect 7 3-i.e., interests arising out of in-
equalities between real people rather than generic or abstract
inequalities.
Justice McIntyre stated the purpose of section 15 in these words:
It is clear that the purpose of s. 15 is to ensure equality in the
formulation and application of the law. The promotion of equality
entails the promotion of a society in which all are secure in the
knowledge that they are recognized at law as human beings equally
deserving of concern, respect and consideration. It has a large re-
medial component.74
Justice Wilson added: "It is consistent with the constitutional status
of s. 15 that it be interpreted with sufficient flexibility to ensure the
unremitting protection of equality rights in the years to come."'
Although the statements do not tell us much more than does the
section itself, read in the context of the entire judgment, it is appar-
ent that the Court was adopting a broad and generous approach to
the section's purpose similar to that which the Court had earlier
used in the interpretation of human rights legislation."
72. See, e.g., Re Pub. Serv. Employee Relations Act, [19871 1 S.C.R. 313, 394;
Reference Re Bill 30, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148, 1176; Retail, Wholesale and Dep't Store
Union v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, 604-05; R. v. Big M Drug Mart
Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, 344; Reference re Section 94(2) of Motor Vehicle Act,
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, 499-500.
73. Andrews v. Law Soc'y of British Columbia, [19891 1 S.C.R. 143. 170.
74. Id. at 171 (McIntyre, J., dissenting in part).
75. Id. at 153.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 41-50.
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B. The Meaning of Equality and Discrimination
Addressing the constitutional meaning of equality, the Andrews
Court first made it clear that sameness of treatment is not necessa-
rily equality." Justice McIntyre stated: "It must be recognized at
once . . . that every difference in treatment between individuals
under the law will not necessarily result in inequality and, as well,
that identical treatment may frequently produce serious
inequality."7 8
In Andrews the Court rejected the view that any distinction con-
stitutes discrimination and also rejected the view that discrimina-
tion requires the plaintiff to prove that a distinction is unfair or un-
reasonable.79 The Court's definition of discrimination, drawn from
its human rights jurisprudence, places the emphasis on the impact
of the law regardless of whether there was intention to discriminate
or not. The unanimous court stated:
[D]iscrimination may be described as a distinction, whether inten-
tional or not but based on grounds relating to personal characteris-
tics of the individual or group, which has the effect of imposing
burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on such individual or group
not imposed upon others, or which withholds or limits access to
opportunities, benefits, and advantages available to other members
of society. Distinctions based on personal characteristics attributed
to an individual solely on the basis of association with a group will
rarely escape the charge of discrimination, while those based on an
individual's merits and capacities will rarely be so classed.80
Rejecting sameness of treatment as the only meaning of equality
is a significant departure from traditional constitutional values.81 It
amounts to a recognition that Canadian society is made up of a di-
versity of groups and individuals in different circumstances with dif-
ferent needs. The rejection is particularly significant for women.
Under the sameness-of-treatment approach, when women have dis-
crimination complaints they are always compared to men. In a male-
dominated society, the equality standards that women are forced to
accept are designed to meet male, not female, needs. By contrast,
the approach adopted in Andrews gives women the opportunity to
challenge male-defined structures and institutions that disadvantage
77. Andrews v. Law Soc'y of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 164.
78. Id.
79. The Court left this part of the analysis to be decided under section 1 of the
Charter, which states: "The [Charter] guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it
subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justi-
fied in a free and democratic society." Charter, supra note 1, § 1.
80. Andrews v. Law Soc'y of British Columbia, [19891 1 S.C.R. 174-75 (McIntyre,
J., dissenting in part). The Andrews majority was in agreement with Justice McIn-
tyre's interpretation of section 15. Id. at 151.
81. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected an effects-based approach in Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
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them, and to set their own norms based on their own needs and
characteristics. The Court's statement that identical treatment can
accentuate inequality incorporates the idea that neutral laws or poli-
cies can violate section 15 if they have a disparate impact on disad-
vantaged individuals or groups. This results-oriented approach ex-
pands the protective ambit of the equality guarantees under the
Charter substantially beyond that permitted by the equal protection
doctrine adopted under the Bills of Rights in both Canada and the
United States.
There are additional implications from a remedial perspective.
When discrimination is found, an effects-based approach allows for
affirmative remedial responses. Although the remedial options in-
clude striking down the law or policy, they also include reforming an
unconstitutional provision to secure equality of outcomes or imple-
menting special measures to alleviate the disadvantage it causes or
exacerbates. These affirmative remedies will require the standards,
rules, laws, and policies of the status quo to be challenged in consid-
eration of past, existing, and future adverse effects and systemic dis-
crimination.82 The process of pleading and proof may go some con-
siderable way to identifying and remedying systemic disadvantage.
Once this information is in the public domain, other members of
excluded groups will be in a much more advantageous legal and po-
litical position to argue for better access to resources, or to skill, ed-
ucation, and employment opportunities8" without necessarily invok-
ing the legal process.
In cases involving discriminatory allocation of benefits, courts may
be especially inclined to adopt a "positive" rights approach. When
under-inclusive legislation is found unconstitutional,8 ' the ability to
promote equality is greatly enhanced if courts extend benefits to
those improperly excluded. On the other hand, if courts limit them-
selves to merely striking down unequal benefit provisions, the result
in most cases will be contrary to the purpose of the equality guaran-
tees. The only thing achieved will be a guarantee that groups or in-
dividuals have the same entitlement to no benefits. This "dog in the
manger" approach to equality produces sameness rather than equal-
82. See N. Colleen Sheppard, Recognition of the Disadvantaging of Women The
Promise of Andrews v. Law Soc'y of British Columbia, 35 McGILL LJ 207, 215
(1989).
83. Accord Canadian Nat'l Ry. v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Comm'nJ,
[19871 1 S.C.R. 1114, 1143.
84. This was the case in Schachter v. Canada, 119901 2 F.C. 129 (Fed. CL). and
that finding has been appealed by the Federal Government to the Supreme Court of
Canada. A similar result was achieved in Re Blainey and Ontario Hockey Ass'n, 54
O.R. 2d 513 (Ont. Ct. App. 1986) (leave to appeal denied), where the court, applying
the Ontario Human Rights Code, excluded application of the Code's nondiscrimina-
tion provisions to the Ontario Hockey Association, which in turn refused to allow girls
to play hockey on any of their teams.
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ity and should be avoided when equality of result is the desired goal.
This issue arose in Schachter v. Canada,8" a case currently before
the Supreme Court. The plaintiff in Schachter is challenging the
Unemployment Insurance Act 8 under section 15 of the Charter on
the ground that he, a biological father, has been denied parental
leave benefits available to adoptive parents" and to biological
mothers.8 The Federal Court of Appeal found a breach of section 15
and also accepted the argument that striking down the parental
leave provisions would not promote equality, even though it would
place both natural and adoptive parents in the same position. The
court held that as long as the Act remains in its present form, it
must provide both natural parents with the same childcare benefits
available to adoptive parents.88 As a result, the law in Canada today
is that courts have the authority to extend statutory benefits to
those who have been improperly excluded from them. We await a
final determination from the Supreme Court.
C. Rejection of the "Similarly Situated" Test
Perhaps the most emphatic aspect of the Court's discussion of
equality in Andrews was its rejection of the "similarly situated"
test-the Aristotelian principle of formal equality.90 In no uncertain
terms, Justice McIntyre argued that the test is seriously deficient,
ignores the content of the law, is tautological, and could even justify
Hitler's Nuremburg laws as long as all Jews were treated similarly. 1
The similarly-situated test determines discrimination by starting
from the proposition that things that are alike should be treated
alike and things that are unlike should be treated unalike in propor-
tion to their unlikeness. Part of the reason the Court criticized the
test so harshly was that it provides no guidance as to what should
follow once a finding of difference or "unlikeness" is made. The
Bliss pregnancy case makes this point. Once the Court in Bliss de-
termined that pregnant women workers were "different" than men
and non-pregnant women workers, there was nothing to prevent the
government from treating pregnant workers in a way that disadvan-
taged them because of their pregnancy.92 The similarly-situated test
permitted this treatment even if the determination of "difference"
85. [1990] 2 F.C. 129.
86. Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, ch. 48, 1970-1972 S.C. 981 (Can.).
87. Id., ch. 48, § 20.
88. Id., ch. 48, § 30.
89. Schachter v. Canada, [19901 2 F.C. at 150.
90. Andrews v. Law Soc'y of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 166.
91. Id. But see William Black & Lynn Smith, Canadian Citizenship and the
Right to Practice Law, 68 CAN. BAR REV. 591, 660-701. See also Joseph Tussman &
Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF L. REv. 341, 345-46
(1949).
92. Bliss v. Attorney Gen. of Canada, [19791 1 S.C.R. at 183.
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relied solely on the subjective values, stereotypes, or biases of the
judges at the time. No requirement of objective rationality, cer-
tainty, or fairness of treatment was required.
Another related weakness the Court identified in the similarly-sit-
uated test is the way similarity is measured. When women are com-
pared to men, their opportunity to be treated as equal is limited to
the extent that they are the same as men. This superficial form of
analysis severely limits and circumscribes women's equality claims.
As Catharine MacKinnon has observed, this approach in practice
means that if men don't need it, women don't get it." Issues such as
pregnancy discrimination, sexual harassment, violence against
women, reproductive choice, and pornography fall outside the scru-
tiny of constitutional equality guarantees because men, the compar-
ators, have no comparable needs and the similarly-situated test is
not met. There is, thus, no legal basis for complaint. In other words,
many legally sanctioned abuses women suffer are not considered
equality issues at all. The similarly-situated theory effectively works
to obscure the systemic, historically embedded, disadvantaged real-
ity of women because of the narrowness of its scope.
On the other hand, when discrimination is measured in terms of
disadvantage, as it was in Andrews, the court asks whether a claim-
ant is a member of a "discreet and insular minority"' that has ex-
perienced persistent disadvantage on the basis of personal charac-
teristics such as those listed in section 15. "Persistent disadvantage"
is determined contextually by examining the group in the entire so-
cial, political, and legal fabric of our society."' If the measure under
attack continues or worsens that disadvantage, it violates the equal-
ity guarantee. No comparator is required.
When the disadvantage test is applied to gender inequality cases,
women's social subordination is recognized in terms of a sexual hier-
archy with women on the bottom. This revelation adds a new di-
mension to constitutional equality analysis because it finally re-
quires the law to confront the reality that women suffer from
socially created inequality. The systematic abuse and deprivation of
power they experience is due to their place in the sexual hierarchy.
Viewed this way, the inappropriateness of the similarly-situated
test is obvious. The test assumes that those using it enjoy social
equality and are therefore entitled to legal equality. When one is
born socially unequal because of gender (or other personal charac-
teristics), it is almost impossible to be the same as-or to be "simi-
larly situated" to-the socially advantaged. If true equality or equal-
93. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Lau, 100 YALE
L.J 1281 (1991).
94. Andrews v. Law Soc'y of British Columbia, 119891 1 S.C.R. at 183 (quoting
United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)).
95. See R. v. Turpin, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296, 1331.
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ity of result is the desired goal of constitutionally entrenched
equality guarantees, the Andrews analysis is much more appropriate
than that used under the Bill of Rights because the real problem of
the socially disadvantaged-the inequality of power between domi-
nant and subordinate groups-can be addressed. The similarly-situ-
ated criterion, by concerning itself only with sameness and differ-
ence, remains in the realm of the abstract. 6
This is not to say that the related concept of sameness of treat-
ment is always inappropriate. It clearly is not. History shows us that
personal characteristics that make people "different"-whether gen-
der, skin colour, disability, age, or religion-have often put them in
the categories of greatest disadvantage. In some situations, identical
treatment with those who are the most advantaged will be the most
appropriate and effective remedy. In other circumstances, however,
different treatment may be required to alleviate the disadvantage.
That different treatment will vary in each case, depending upon the
facts. What is most attractive and practical about the Andrews deci-
sion is the flexibility it offers to the measurement of equality and
the ability it gives the judge to identify and remedy systemic disad-
vantage in a variety of different ways.
D. The Scope of the Equality Guarantee
The decision in Andrews both broadened and narrowed the scope
of the equality provisions. The criterion of disadvantage broadened
the scope of section 15 to cover unintentional or adverse-impact dis-
crimination. On the other hand, it limited the scope of the equality
guarantees in terms of standing. In other words, claims by individu-
als or groups which cannot prove disadvantage by legislative classifi-
cation will rarely succeed.
It could be said that the plaintiff in Andrews, a white, male,
highly educated, healthy, and able-bodied person was not in the cat-
egory of "disadvantaged." However, the contextual approach, as ap-
plied to this plaintiff (as a member of the group of non-citizens), put
him within a group analogous to the enumerated groups in section
15. Justice Wilson explained that non-citizens, because of their lack
of political power, are "vulnerable to having their interests over-
looked and their rights to equal concern and respect violated. 97 She
emphasized that the question of whether a group is analogous to
those enumerated in section 15 must be assessed not only within the
context of the challenged law, but also in the context of society
generally.9 8
Determining disadvantage by going outside the legislation is very
96. See Sheppard, supra note 84, at 218-22.
97. Andrews v. Law Soc'y of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 152.
98. Id.
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significant because any rational litigant, regardless of group affilia-
tion, will always be disadvantaged by the legislation which is the
subject matter of his or her complaint. If the Court is going to ad-
here to a purposive approach it must be able to determine whether
or not the complaint fits into overall patterns of disadvantage and
whether or not identical or differential treatment is discriminatory.
Justice Wilson explains: "[I]t is only by examining the larger con-
text that a court can determine whether differential treatment re-
sults in inequality or whether, contrariwise, it would be identical
treatment which would in the particular context result in inequality
or foster disadvantage."' 9 An external evaluation allows the Court to
ensure that those who suffer persistent disadvantage will benefit
from section 15 guarantees while those with generic or abstract
equality claims will have to take their complaints to some other
forum.'
0o
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR WOMEN'S LEGAL AND SOCIAL EQuALITY
At a minimum, the decision in Andrews will allow Canadian
courts to hear women's stories, whether they have to do with racism,
pregnancy, heterosexism, age, poverty, disabilities, or dominance of
the white culture. 10 1 No longer are women held hostage by abstract
doctrinal rules that obliterate their reality. The constitutional ap-
proach to equality adopted by the Supreme Court provides women
with an opportunity to educate the judiciary about their lives. Cases
decided after Andrews show the promise held out by this approach.
In Brooks v. Canada Safeway,"0 2 for example, the Supreme Court
of Canada overturned Bliss,'0° which had decided, under the Bill of
Rights, that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy did not consti-
tute sex discrimination. In Brooks, as in Bliss, pregnant women
plaintiffs had received disfavoured treatment. On this occasion,
however, the Court said that, notwithstanding the fact that only
women get pregnant, the disfavoured treatment constituted sex dis-
crimination. The Court not only found it unnecessary to find a male
equivalent to the condition of pregnancy, it specifically held that the
disadvantage the pregnant women suffered came about because of
their condition-because of their difference. In recognizing such dis-
crimination, Chief Justice Dickson described its invidious nature as
well as its social costs:
99. R. v. Turpin, [19891 1 S.C.R. at 1331-32.
100. See L. Smith, Gender Equality in the Canadian Context: Implications For
Judicial Decision Making (unpublished course materials. Judicial Education Seminar
(1991), Western Judicial Education Centre, 1362 Mathers Avenue. Vancouver, British
Columbia, V7V 2K5).
101. Id.
102. 119891 1 S.C.R. 1219.
103. Id. at 1243.
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Combining paid work with motherhood and accommodating the
childbearing needs of working women are ever-increasing impera-
tives. That those who bear children and benefit society as a whole
thereby should not be economically or socially disadvantaged
seems to bespeak the obvious. It is only women who bear children;
no man can become pregnant. As I argued earlier, it is unfair to
impose all the costs of pregnancy upon one half of the population.
It is difficult to conceive that distinctions or discriminations based
upon pregnancy could ever be regarded as other than discrimina-
tion based upon sex, or that restrictive statutory conditions appli-
cable only to pregnant women did not discriminate against them as
women. 10'
Although Brooks was decided under human rights legislation, the
interrelationship of human rights and Charter equality principles
fused by the Andrews case suggests future possibilities for the
Court's approach to constitutional equality. Certainly the tone, rea-
soning, and language of Brooks is a far cry from the earlier decision
in Bliss.
Another recent human rights case, Janzen v. Platy Enterprises,"0
dealt with sexual harassment. In Janzen the Supreme Court unani-
mously overturned a lower court's decision which had concluded
that sexual harassment did not constitute sex discrimination. As in
Brooks, the Court rejected formalistic, "sameness" reasoning in fa-
vour of the approach adopted in Andrews. Rather than merely rely-
ing on the concept of adverse-effect discrimination, which could
have resolved the matter in favour of the complainants, the Court
developed a much more sophisticated analysis that explained the re-
lationship between sexual harassment and gender. Writing for the
Court, Chief Justice Dickson first discussed how sexual harassment
has a differential impact on women in terms of the gender hierarchy
of the labour force and the inherent "abuse of both economic and
sexual power" that the harassment 0 8 entails. The Court then de-
fined sex discrimination in the manner suggested by Andrews:
"[Djiscrimination on the basis of sex may be defined as practices or
attitudes which have the effect of limiting the conditions of employ-
ment of, or the employment opportunities available to, employees
on the basis of a characteristic related to gender. 1 0 7
Looking at the social and economic realities of women, the dispa-
rate impact of sexual harassment, and the gender hierarchy of the
workforce, the Court concluded that sexual harassment amounted to
sex discrimination. The lower court's analysis that led to the conclu-
sion that sexual harassment involved discrimination on the basis of
104. Id. at 1243-44.
105. [19891 1 S.C.R. 1252.
106. Id. at 1284.
107. Id. at 1279.
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sexual attractiveness of the victim, not discrimination on the basis
of sex, was much like that in Bliss, where the lower court had held
that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was not discrimination
on the basis of sex. The lower court in Janzen also thought that
sexual harassment was treatment accorded to an individual, and
that the victim's gender was irrelevant. The Supreme Court of Can-
ada rejected these views as misconceived. It said:
While the concept of discrimination is rooted in the notion of
treating an individual as part of a group rather than on the basis of
the individual's personal characteristics, discrimination does not
require uniform treatment of all members of a particular group. It
is sufficient that the ascribing of a group characteristic to an indi-
vidual is a factor in the treatment of that individual.08
Chief Justice Dickson went on to observe that the notion of sexual
attractiveness, like pregnancy, cannot be separated from gender.1'0
The contextualized approach used by the Janzen Court demon-
strated sensitivity to women's perspectives. The Court appeared to
understand that in the context of a deeply sexist society that objec-
tifies women's bodies and perpetuates a male-defined image of sex-
ual attractiveness, the practice of sexual harassment cannot be sepa-
rated from the unequal relations of sexual interaction that
disadvantage women." ' The Court noted with approval the view
that a hostile or offensive working environment created by sexual
harassment "is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at
the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality.""'
The Brooks and Janzen decisions are positive and important legal
victories for women in Canada. Although neither were Charter cases,
they further developed the approach to discrimination articulated in
Andrews and revised legal doctrine that previously reflected only
male-defined norms. Two other important cases demonstrating a
willingness on the part of the Court to question male assumptions
underlying the law are R. v. Morgentaler"2 and R. v. La Vallee." 3
In Morgentaler the Criminal Code legislation relating to abortion
was struck down on the ground that it violated section 7 of the
Charter, which guarantees everyone "the right to life, liberty and
security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof ex-
cept in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice."" 4
108. Id. at 1288.
109. Id. at 1290.
110. Sheppard, supra note 84, at 233. See also CATHARINE A MACKINNON, TiaE
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN_ A CASE OF SEX Discm.MNAToN 70.77
(1979).
111. Janzen v. Platy Enter., [1989] 1 S.C.R. at 1284 (quoting Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)).
112. [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30.
113. [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852.
114. Charter, supra note 1, § 7.
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The majority of the Court found the legislation unconstitutional as a
violation of the security of the person guarantee. Justice Wilson, in a
concurring opinion, expanded the reasoning under the liberty guar-
antee, linking the notion of being a woman with the notion of being
human in a way never before articulated in Canadian jurisprudence.
She described the implications of an unwanted pregnancy as follows:
This decision [whether to seek an abortion] is one that will have
profound psychological, economic and social consequences for the
pregnant woman. . . It is a decision that deeply reflects the way
the woman thinks about herself and her relationship to others and
to society at large. It is not just a medical decision; it is a profound
social and ethical one as well. Her response to it will be a response
of the whole person." 5
She elaborated on the point by rejecting male-centred norms that
influence the concept of "liberty" because the experiences of preg-
nancy, giving birth, and abortion are ones for which men have no
analogy:
It is probably impossible for a man to respond, even imaginatively,
to such a dilemma not just because it is outside the realm of his
personal experience (although this is, of course, the case) but be-
cause he can relate to it only by objectifying it, thereby eliminating
the subjective elements of the female psyche which are at the heart
of the dilemma. As Noreen Burrows, lecturer in European Law at
the University of Glasgow, has pointed out . . . the history of the
struggle for human rights from the eighteenth century on has been
the history of men struggling to assert their dignity and common
humanity against an overbearing state apparatus. The more recent
struggle for women's rights has been a struggle to eliminate dis-
crimination, to achieve a place for women in a man's world, to de-
velop a set of legislative reforms in order to place women in the
same position as men. It has not been a struggle to define the
rights of women in relation to their special place in the societal
structure and in relation to the biological distinction between the
two sexes. Thus, women's needs and aspirations are only now being
translated into protected rights. The right to reproduce or not to
reproduce which is in issue in this case is one such right and is
properly perceived as an integral part of modern woman's struggle
to assert her dignity and worth as a human being." 6
Although Justice Wilson did not refer to section 28 of the Charter,
its values are implied in her judgment. Clearly, if liberty and secur-
ity rights are to be enjoyed equally by male and female persons,
courts must interpret laws which infringe upon these rights in a way
that is meaningful for women as women. The Morgentaler decision
is a landmark case for future gender equality jurisprudence because
115. R. v. Morgentaler, [1988 1 S.C.R. at 171 (Wilson, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 171-72 (citation omitted).
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it interpreted the abortion law from the empathetic perspective of
the experiences, aspirations, and problems of women and demon-
strated how courts can begin to incorporate women's reality within
the meaning of Constitutional rights.
Lavallee demonstrates the effect of Andrews beyond constitu-
tional and human rights law. Lavallee involved the criminal law of
self-defence in the prosecution of a woman who shot her partner in
the back of the head as he left her room. The shooting occurred
after an argument in which the appellant had been physically
abused and was fearful for her life, having been taunted with the
threat that if she did not kill him first, he would kill her. She had
frequently been a victim of his physical abuse. In assessing her de-
fence of self-defence, the Court recognized the inequities perpetu-
ated by the sameness-of-treatment model of equality. Borrowing an-
alytically from the approach adopted in Andrews, the Court found
that the common law self-defence criterion of "imminent danger" is
gender-biased when applied in the context of wife abuse.' 7
Expert evidence on the battered wife syndrome was held to be
admissible, which in turn allowed the Court to apply a woman-cen-
tered approach to the criterion of reasonableness. The Court stated:
"Given the relational context in which the violence occurs, the
mental state of an accused at the critical moment she pulls the trig-
ger cannot be understood except in terms of the cumulative effect of
months or years of brutality." ' The Court then extended the anal-
ysis to recognize the gender specificity of battering. In reasoning
similar to that of Morgentaler, Justice Wilson, writing for a unani-
mous court, questioned the male-defined concept of reasonableness
when it is women who are the victims:
If it strains credibility to imagine what the "ordinary man" would
do in the position of a battered spouse, it is probably because men
do not typically find themselves in that situation. Some women do,
however. The definition of what is reasonable must be adapted to
circumstances which are, by and large, foreign to the world inhab-
ited by the hypothetical "reasonable man". 1
In its conclusion, the Court determined that the law's traditional
concept of self-defence evolved out of a "bar-room brawl" model
that comprehends only a male concept of reasonableness. In order to
be fair to women and (presumably) to recognize their right to equal
protection and benefit of the law, the Court reconstructed the de-
fence. It is quite clear from the decision that Charter values underlie
Lavallee even though the Charter was not argued in the case.
Another noteworthy example is the Supreme Court's decision in
117. R. v. Lavallee, [1990] 1 S.C.R. at 876.
118. Id. at 880.
119. Id. at 874.
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R. v. Keegstra."2 ° Although not involving gender equality directly,
its implications for future sex equality jurisprudence are consider-
able. This was a freedom of expression case involving a constitu-
tional challenge to a hate propaganda law in the Criminal Code. The
Court upheld the law as, among other things, advancing equality
and preventing harm. The Keegstra Court supported the regulation
of hate propaganda on the ground that its dissemination constituted
a practice of inequality. In doing so, the Court used section 15 in a
unique way. It said that the constitutional guarantee could be used
not only to strike down laws which discriminate, but also to consti-
tutionally support laws which further section 15 values. Further, it
held that section 15's objective of promoting social equality is rele-
vant to the inquiry about justifiable limits on freedom of expression.
The Court examined the larger social, political, and legal contexts of
the groups targeted for protection by the hate propaganda provi-
sions and weighed them against the free speech interests of hate
mongers. In other words, the Court contemplated the social meaning
of hate propaganda and uncovered its harmful effects.1 ' Once these
were revealed, the weighing of interests resulted in the establish-
ment of equality as a pre-eminent value in Canadian society. In
Keegstra, the centrality of equality to the full enjoyment of individ-
ual as well as group rights demonstrated a firm acceptance of the
view that equality is a positive right, that the Charter's equality pro-
vision has a large remedial component, and that legislatures should
take positive measures to improve the status of disadvantaged
groups. Most importantly, Keegstra demonstrated the Charter's po-
tential to achieve social change, envisioning a society that responds
to needs, honours difference, and rejects abstractions. Keegstra
should have major implications for the issue of women's equality
raised by pornography.
Finally, on February 27, 1992, the Supreme Court decided R. v.
Butler. 22 In Butler, the Court unanimously upheld Canada's anti-
obscenity law,1 23 using a harms-based equality analysis. The Court
held that the law infringed freedom of expression as protected by
Section 2(b)124 of the Charter, but that it nevertheless passed the
section 1 "reasonable limit" test. 25 Although the Court declined to
120. [19911 2 W.W.R. 1 (Can. Sup. Ct. 1990).
121. Id.
122. R. v. Butler and McCord, - S.C.R. -, 134 N.R. 81 (Can. 1992).
123. R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 163 (1985) (Can.).
124. Section 2 of the Charter states, in pertinent part, "Everyone has the follow-
ing fundamental freedoms: . . . freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression,
including freedom of the press and other media of communication. ... Charter,
supra note 1, § 2.
125. Section 1 states that the Charter "guarantees the rights and freedoms set out
in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society." Charter, supra note 1, § 1.
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accept the argument that some forms of pornography fall outside
the Charter's ambit because they constitute a violent form of ex-
pression, the Court focused on the harms of violence, degradation,
and dehumanization in pornography as the basis for its decision.
The Court limited its deliberations to an examination of the defi-
nition of obscenity in section 163 of the statute, which defines ob-
scenity as "the undue exploitation of sex, or of sex and one or more
of the following subjects, namely, crime, horror, cruelty and vio-
lence."' 26 The Court said that the meaning of "undue" must be de-
termined by a "community standard of tolerance.' 12 7 This determi-
nation must be made on the basis of the degree of harm that may
flow from such exposure, harm of the type which predisposes per-
sons to act in an anti-social manner. In explicitly finding pornogra-
phy to be harmful, the Court held that it harms women's rights to
be equal, their sense of self-worth, and their physical safety. The
harm is exacerbated, the Court said, by the "burgeoning pornogra-
phy industry," making the regulatory objective of Parliament more
pressing and substantial now than when the statute was first
enacted. 12
8
Most significantly, in its section 1 analysis the Court clarified the
purpose of the obscenity provisions. It said that Parliament's objec-
tive is not moral disapprobation but, rather, avoidance of harm of
the type which potentially victimizes women."' This classification in
the law is of historic importance. For the first time, the Supreme
Court of Canada has linked the obscene with what subordinates or
degrades women rather than with what offends some notion of sex-
ual morality.
Having found that the purpose of the legislation was the avoid-
ance of harm, the Court had little difficulty in finding that the regu-
lation of pornography can be constitutionally justified. For example,
Justice Sopinka, writing for the Court, observed that the harms
analysis makes it untenable to argue that time, place, and manner
restrictions are a better form of regulation than prohibition. This is
correct because imposing heavy taxes on pornography, or requiring
special licences for its distribution, sends the message that harms to
women will be tolerated as long as the user pays. Government would
126. R-S.C., ch. C-46, § 163(8) (1985) (Can.).
127. R. v. Butler, - S.C.R. at - , 134 N.R. at 105. According to the Court,
the type of sexual material at which the statute aims is the portrayal of sex coupled
with violence or explicit sex that is degrading or dehumanizing-both of which create
a substantial risk of harm. Explicit sex which is neither violent nor degrading nor
dehumanizing will not be considered obscene unless it involves the use of children in
its production. The Court recognized an exception to the law where the obscene de-
piction is necessary for artistic purposes or for the serious treatment of a theme. Id.
at 113.
128. Id. at 134.
129. Id. at 127.
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be complicit in the pornography trade, and even become a partici-
pant in it, if it collected such taxes or issued such licences. Justice
Sopinka pointed out how inconsistent and hypocritical it is to argue
that time, place, and manner restrictions are preferable once the
state has reasonably concluded that certain acts are harmful to cer-
tain groups in society. To permit such acts as long as conditions are
more restrictive is wrong because the harm sought to be avoided re-
mains the same in either case. ' This approach is encouraging be-
cause it means that the Charter is not neutral on practices which
promote inequality. Rather, it is a constitutional commitment to
ending them.
The suggestion that reactive solutions to the problems caused by
the degradation of women, such as the provision of counselling for
rape victims, are more effective than absolute prohibitions, also loses
its force once harms are recognized. As alternatives to prohibition,
reactive solutions imply that women must absorb the harm caused
by the very behaviour encouraged by pornography. It is hard to be-
lieve that such a requirement could have any credibility in a society
which is free and democratic and aspires to the most basic norms of
human rights. Certainly these and other measures should be offered
to protect women from violent men. But to argue, as the civil liber-
ties intervenors in Butler did, that such responses are preferable to
controlling the dissemination of the very image that contributes to
such behaviours, diminishes the harm and consequently diminishes
women and children as full citizens. As the Court emphasized, seri-
ous social problems, such as violence against women and children,
require a multifaceted approach.'
In examining the freedom-of-expression values of seeking and at-
taining the truth, participating in the political process, and individ-
ual self-fulfillment, the Court found, as it did in Keegstra,'2 that
speech which harms people is of low value. The Court said that the
kind of expression represented by pornography does not stand on an
equal footing with other kinds of expression.' 33 The Court but-
tressed this view by taking judicial notice of the fact that pornogra-
phy is motivated, in the overwhelming majority of cases, by eco-
nomic profit.' 3 In summary, the Court's recognition that the sexual
exploitation of women and children can lead to "abject and servile
victimization' 35 as well as other types of harm goes some way to-
ward redistributing speech rights between men and women. The
Court's contextually sensitive method of defining pornography is re-
130. Id. at 145-46.
131. Id. at 146-47.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 120-21.
133. R. v. Butler, - S.C.R. - , 134 N.R. at 137.
134. Id. at 137, 142.
135. Id. at 132 (citation omitted).
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sponsive to progress in the knowledge and understanding of pornog-
raphy and its harms. The Butler decision is a welcome and impor-
tant development in the law which other countries and the
international human rights community should contemplate if they
are genuinely serious about the issues of women's human rights, vio-
lence against women, and women's equality.
VII. CONCLUSION
Just as in Andrews, Schachter, Morgentaler, Lavallee, Brooks
and Janzen, the Keegstra and Butler decisions demonstrate a re-
thinking of legal concepts. The assumption that human behaviour
can be generalized into natural universal laws is being challenged by
an analytical approach which favours context rather than detached
objectivity. Starting in human rights cases, elaborated and expanded
upon in Charter equality cases, this new approach is now reaching
into criminal and civil law. By expanding the perimeters of the dis-
cussion, previously hidden facts and issues are exposed. The cases
demonstrate that social and economic arrangements that have been
taken for granted often disadvantage women in a multitude of ways.
To redress past wrongs, equality principles have been taken beyond
the sameness approach as the courts have begun to realize that not
all individuals have suffered historical, generic exclusion on the basis
of their group membership. Where barriers impede fairness for some
individuals, they must be removed-even if this means treating
some people differently. The Supreme Court of Canada has demon-
strated in a number of cases on a wide range of issues that gender
equality in the Canadian context is now result-oriented. Rights and
duties are being allocated equitably, not simply on the basis of ab-
stract, doctrinally stagnant principles of formal equality that thwart
rather than achieve substantive equality.
This is not to say that real equality has been achieved in Canada.
Far from it. What it does say is that a major stumbling block to its
achievement has been identified, and that a methodology has been
developed to move toward our country's proclaimed commitment to
legal and social equality. Much remains to be done, but what is criti-
cally important is that women can now address, in constitutional
terms, the deepest roots of social inequality of the sexes. Issues such
as reproductive control and sexual violence can now be considered
sex equality issues, and laws dealing with these issues can be sub-
jected to constitutional scrutiny. The Supreme Court of Canada is
the first high court in the world to adopt the reality of social disad-
vantage as a basis for constitutional equality analysis. As a result, it
will be the first court with an opportunity to change it.'
136. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Breaking New Ground. LEAF LINEs. (Women's
Legal Education and Action Fund) Feb. 1990, at 2.

